Pheno­mena of One-World Hegemony: About Globa­lism and revol­ving door practices

 

The struggle for & against one-world domination

Turning points in world history are mostly trig­gered by conflict of inte­rests among old and new powers with their rele­vant circles of society and being confronted by economic upheavals.

Indus­tria­liza­tion and simul­ta­neous colo­niza­tion provided Great Britain with the foun­da­tions to compete with the Russian Tsarist Empire – the largest land power in Eurasia – as a world power in the 19th century:

After the Napo­leonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna in 1815, a balance of power in Europe was able to safe­guard the given order for over a century until 1914:

The conti­nental powers of Central Europe and Asia followed indus­tria­liza­tion, as demons­trated by Great Britain, but with a time lag behind. Globa­liza­tion and colo­nial policy were largely domi­nated by the mari­time powers of Western Europe. This deve­lo­p­ment caused the globa­lists to shift their centres of global control from the former Byzan­tium, Venice, Genoa, Switz­er­land and Nether­lands towards the West – i.e. Great Britain and later also USA.

The unifying signa­ture of „global“ heraldry can be seen in insignia:

From 1190, English ships in the Medi­ter­ra­nean used the Genoese flag being placed under the protec­tion of the Genoese fleet. The English king had to pay an annual tribute to Genoa for that. Later the flag became that of England and remained so until today.

Towards the end of the 19th century it became appa­rent that:

• Great Britain in its given shape would not be able to main­tain its mono­poly posi­tion against rapidly growing conti­nental powers.
• the multi­polar world order at the turn of the century in 1900 intert­wined with world trade, stood at the oppo­sing end to the concepts of the One-World- Hegemony driven by the globalists.

Against this back­ground, trans­na­tional circles from UK agreed to have lifted the United States the to a centre of global gover­nance as concep­tual-state in alli­ance with Great Britain. The agree­ment was reached infor­mally at the supra­na­tional level and has been only commu­ni­cated to the outside world under the hazy term of „Special Rela­ti­onship.“

A dress rehearsal of the new combi­na­tion had been made possible in concerted action at the turn of the century via the British Second Boer War (1899 – 1902) and the bloody colo­niza­tion of the Phil­ip­pines by the United States via the American-Phil­ip­pine War (1899 – 1902). After the leap over the Pacific to the Phil­ip­pines, the USA reached-out over the Atlantic in the course of the 1st World War (1914 – 1918) for dismant­ling Middle Europe: For this the United States had to declare their (world) war to the II German Empire on April 6, 1917 and Austria-Hungary on December 7, 1917. The destruc­tion of Middle Europe was the neces­sary step in the ongoing cons­truc­tion of Atlantic world domination.

Thus, repre­sen­ta­tives of the globa­lists had repo­si­tioned the concept-state USA as a global control-centre on the ruins of the British Empire in 1917. World War I, however, had put an end to the UK holding the world currency: By 1919 the US-Dollar took over from the British Pound Ster­ling as the new world currency in place.

Pheno­mena of Trans­na­tional Global Domination

The disem­power­ment of nation-states and trans­for­ma­tion into protec­to­rates, project – as well as souvenir states has become the precon­di­tions of mono­polar global domi­na­tion and has become visible as phenomena:

The mira­cu­lous increase of nation states after 1918.

At the turn of the century 1900, there were 54 sove­reign states, inclu­ding nine great powers by repre­sen­ting basi­cally a multi­polar world order.

The United Nations had 51 foun­ding members in 1945. But only a short time later, the United Nations had grown to 193 states. Mass media and poli­tical repre­sen­ta­tives tire­lessly portrayed them as „sove­reign“ and „equal“ to each other only.

But what do Atlantic analysts in small circles say about this?

Such insights of Atlantic poli­tical scien­tists make it clear, that the mira­cu­lous increase of nation states after World War I had often produced only desi­gner states and protec­to­rates. Thus, it was not multi­polar diver­sity that shaped the new world order, but rather mono­polar forces opera­ting in the background.

The goal of the globa­lists has been, in the first step, to elimi­nate all multi-ethnic states from the scene: At the time of World War I, these were the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hunga­rian Monarchy and, last but not least, the most important of the three – the multi-ethnic state of Russia. Russia unites 180 ethnic groups under its fede­ra­tion and commands over size of lands and resources which allow abso­lute sove­reignty and autarky. But the break-up of Russia was not succee­ding until today: Not in World War I – not in World War II – not in the 90’s despite «reform olig­archs» and not even today: With NATO and the „combined West“ in full wartime action.

The dismant­ling of the multi-ethnic states serves the purpose to turn the frag­ments into fake-sove­reign protec­to­rates or vassal states, like for example the Baltic States. At the time of the foun­ding of Lithuania in 1991, there were 3,706 million people living in Lithuania – in 2018, there were only 2,721 million left. Today, the remai­ning popu­la­tions of the Baltic states have been „looked after“ by the US embas­sies. This also explains why, for example, Lithuania risks confron­ta­tion with China over the Taiwan issue: Micro-states are some­times sent as test trails ahead.

The gap between rich and poor is widening.

A look at the U.S. wealth distri­bu­tion from 1990 to 2020 makes it clear, that:

• the richest 1% were able to increase their share to 32% thanks to CoV.
•  the bottom 50%, however, were left with a wealth share of only 2%.

The increase in wealth in the USA since 2008 thanks to CoV shows, that the:

• Top 1% increased their wealth by 10 tril­lion USD during CoV
• Bottom 50% could only increase their wealth by a marginal 0.7 tril­lion USD

The statis­tics show: The national emer­gency decrees, directed against majo­ri­ties, favoured and trig­gered a drastic redis­tri­bu­tion of wealth from the bottom to the top.

Conflict between global, hege­monic & national power

The ongoing turn of an era will result in a new world order, which will be decided by a poli­tical – and mili­tary struggle between the follo­wing three groups of actors:

The Globa­lists

In 2009, a study by ETH Zurich provided evidence that, contrary to popular belief, global poli­tics can be scien­ti­fi­cally proven. It is deter­mined and led by an extreme small group of people.

The scien­tists of the ETH from Zurich summa­rized, as follows:

The rese­ar­chers examined 37 million compa­nies from which they filtered out 43,060 trans­na­tional corpo­ra­tions (TCNs). A core of 1,318 compa­nies control 20% of all reve­nues, but through share­hol­dings control another 60% of all global reve­nues: Less than 2% of all trans­na­tional corpo­ra­tions control 80% of revenues.

This has become extended by a collu­sion of a few dozen finan­cial groups in the style of a closed society. The ETH report shows that in contrast to the extreme corpo­rate collu­sion at the global level, the exact oppo­site is only true for local compa­nies at the Euro­pean level.

This deve­lo­p­ment chal­lenges not only economic compe­ti­tion, but also the sove­reignty of nation states. Because, unlike entre­pre­neurs of national medium-sized compa­nies, which have been condi­tioned not to get involved in poli­tical events in a suffi­ci­ently compre­hen­sive way, globa­lists, in addi­tion to control­ling their finan­cial & economic mono­po­lies, see no problem in acting-out poli­ti­cally and making their poli­tical will clear to the poli­tical estab­lish­ment at the state level and, if neces­sary, impo­sing it by force.

For example, during the CoV pandemic, the mani­fold «experts of science» showed how to keep national govern­ments inca­pable of acting and how to turn them into command recei­vers of trans­na­tional inte­rest groups in the twink­ling of an eye.

U.S. country elites and hege­monic forces.

As mentioned, U.S. country elites had been selected for their future role as world poli­cemen in the late 19th century as part of the «Project USA». The plan has been realized and given the execu­tors inva­luable advan­tages, such as being allowed to noto­riously plunder the world, as has been accu­ra­tely reflected by the chronic U.S. current account defi­cits over so many, if not all the decades.

The American estab­lish­ment quickly became accus­tomed to their new life­style. A major problem arose only after the globa­lists decided at the end of the last century to move the Atlantic control centre to the Far East. It means that many of the previously needed local servants on the ground in the West would no longer be needed in the future any more.

The U.S. country elites seem unwil­ling to relin­quish their privi­leged posi­tion as world poli­cemen and modern feudal lords without resis­tance. They prefer to stick to their hege­monic posi­tion by means of an over-aggres­sive war policy – it could even be called a World War 3.

The Secre­tary of the Secu­rity Council of Russia, Nikolai Patrushev put it this way:

The first phase in the war against Russia by Atlantic hawks foresaw to crush Russia by a coup in Russia and a „victory“ of the Ukrai­nian mili­tary in parallel(!) enab­ling to lead the main strike against China subse­quently. The options of the US war party do not exclude a limited nuclear strike against Russia as well as against China in that context.

Globa­lists, however, are not willing to take such deadly risks and decided – regard­less of their own plans – to act against such high-risk policy of the US hawks in the short term.

The 85% rest as repre­sen­ta­tives of a multi­polar world order

They encom­pass the great powers Russia, China and India with all the other states that do not belong to the West – a total of 6.6 billion inha­bi­tants world-wide.

Some of these states had become victims of colo­nial history. In the new mill­en­nium, this has made them to stand-up against the so-called „West“ and have created a new, more just world order at the appro­priate moment of time.

In the sleaze of the revol­ving doors of Atlantic shadow orgs

Hege­monic concepts are deve­loped at the trans­na­tional level, but must be handed down to non-state actors and orga­niza­tions for imple­men­ta­tion. The realiza­tion is supposed to be incon­spi­cuous to the outside in order to mani­pu­late popu­la­tions as smoothly as possible. It is suffi­cient thereby to occupy only those areas of the control, which are neces­sary for the realiza­tion of appro­priate concepts, like mainly:

• Educa­tional insti­tu­tions, cartel media incl. the cultural sector
• Economic policy and legislature
• Foreign and mone­tary policy

Since the 19th century, trans­na­tional elites have made use of so-called «think tanks» for this purpose to further advance the deve­lo­p­ment of Atlantic colo­nial & mono­poly poli­cies on the opera­tional level: As for example initi­ally with the help of the Fabian Society (1884) or after WW1 via Chatham House (1920). The newly invented „world poli­ceman USA“ has been supported by the Council on Foreign Rela­tions (1921) and other related constructs.

The Fabian Society in the course of time: From wolf in sheep’s clot­hing to new logo|Source: Fabian Society, Public domain, via Wiki­media Commons

The overall system is decisive – not just a single compo­nent | Source: CC/PFR

Squa­ring the Circle or that of Global Dominance

The end of the Cold War in 1990, which trig­gered the phase of „open borders“ similar to the times before 1914, caused the foun­ding of new think tanks to skyro­cket: It is esti­mated that today there are more than 8,000 such cons­tructs world­wide exis­ting, which claim to analyse issues for govern­mental as well as supra­na­tional clients or had been assi­gned to parti­ci­pate in the imple­men­ta­tion of rele­vant concepts.

About 50% of all think tanks are located in the USA and Europe and are instru­men­ta­lized by national elites as well as globa­lists. About 2,000 of them are domic­iled in the USA: They operate bran­ches in Europe and Asia with their objec­tives to foster the protec­to­rates. Outsi­ders often tend to perceive think tanks as a strange or even chari­table type of asso­cia­tion and get mislead.

Think tanks are used by supra­na­tional actors on a project-by-project basis to imple­ment global concepts and disse­mi­nate the required narra­tives. This also includes prescribing the foreign policy for the protec­to­rates and get those synchro­nized  with that of the hegemon respectively.

In prin­ciple, think tanks are «shadow orga­ni­sa­tion» of supra­na­tional power. Parti­cu­larly leading clans at the control level oversee a large number of think tanks, collu­sion with respect to concerted and covert actions has already been orga­niza­tio­nally provided for in place.

For example, the «Peterson Insti­tute for Inter­na­tional Econo­mics» was founded only on the recom­men­da­tions of the presi­dents of GMF and CFR: It’s that simple!

Leading think tank staff some­times work on diffe­rent plat­forms at the same time. In the USA, it has become custom that poli­ti­cians who have turned unem­ployed after the change of admi­nis­tra­tion get tempo­r­a­rily absorbed by think tanks accor­ding to the so-called „revol­ving-door-prin­ciple“: Until their next mission. This is how poli­ti­cians and poli­tical pawns are controlled in the land of unli­mited opportunities.

There are also so-called „phantom think tanks“ that give a distorted impres­sion to the public and hide their true missions behind a facade. A mislea­ding name, for example, may create false asso­cia­tions in the external percep­tion by third parties, but as had been desi­gned for.

The German Marshall Fund can be cited as a case study and shining example:

 

• Contrary to what the „German“ in the name might suggest, that orga­niza­tion was not founded in Germany, but main­tains its head­quar­ters in Washington DC with only bran­ches in Berlin, Brussels, Ankara, Belgrade, Bucha­rest, Paris and Warsaw. Among the foundation’s goals is mentioned to „deepen rela­tions“ between EU-states and the United States. Appro­priate culti­va­tion of young pros­pec­tive poli­ti­cians has been carried out, as done for Anna­lena Baer­bock or Cem Özdemir. In 2021, GFM had assets of USD 211 million and gene­rated reve­nues of USD 67 million. The Euro­pean Commis­sion, the German Federal Foreign Office, Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the U.S. Agency for Inter­na­tional Deve­lo­p­ment and the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs each donated more than $1 million to GMF in 2022.
• Contrary to what the „German“ in the name suggests, the „GMF“ has nothing to do with the „Marshall Fund”, but was estab­lished as a gift from the German taxpayer a full 25 years after the real Marshall Plan was laun­ched in 1972: With DEM 150 million, which was passed via a sepa­rate law by the Bundestag of the four parties in 1972. Obviously, this amount was too little for the reci­pi­ents, so Helmut Kohl increased the dona­tion of the German taxpayers by another 100 million DM in 1986: This finan­cing proce­dure reminds of past tribute payments, but in a very modern guise.
• On its website, GMF, in coope­ra­tion with News­Guard, declares alleged misin­for­ma­tion to clas­sify as either „false content produ­cers“ or „mani­pu­la­tors“ and to finally have them publicly denounced. GMF pretends to know that with regard to the last U.S. presi­den­tial elec­tion, as well as on the spread of CoV, «false and mani­pu­la­tive content» had been in exis­tence, which allows GMF to qualify free expres­sions of opinion, when­ever other opinions do not fit.
• In this way, alter­na­tive media became vili­fied by GMF whereas the narra­tive of censor­ship is insi­diously publi­cized in the public sphere via the back door.

GMF in the foot­s­teps of the Trila­teral Commission

Similar to the Trila­teral Commis­sion, which was estab­lished in July 1973 at the sugges­tion of Zbigniew Brze­ziński and David Rocke­feller to orga­nize a united front against the UdSSR, the GMF’s current agenda seems fully focused on raising a «trans­at­lantic front» against China. Prepa­ra­tions for this target seem well underway, as two hearings before the U.S. Senate Committee by two senior trans­at­lantic fellows of the „German Marshall Fund of the U.S.“ make very clear:

Senate Foreign Rela­tions Committee
Subcom­mittee on Europe and Regional Secu­rity Cooperation
Hearing “Alig­ning trans­at­lantic approa­ches on China”

June 7th 2023 Written Testimony
Andrew Small, Senior Trans­at­lantic Fellow,
the German Marshall Fund of the United States

Andrew Small, Senior Trans­at­lantic Fellow,
the German Marshall Fund of the United States

…

Over the last few years, Europe and the United States have engaged in the most signi­fi­cant over­haul of their poli­cies towards the People’s Repu­blic of China (PRC) since the opening of diplo­matic rela­tions. While the United States has moved further and faster in this process than Europe, the nature of the two sides’ economic, poli­tical and stra­tegic concerns about the PRC, and the analysis of how best to respond, has been highly convergent.

This is reflected in the quality of trans­at­lantic exch­anges on China. Where it was once conten­tious even to address China-related concerns openly between Europe and the United States, coll­ec­tive efforts to do so are now embedded across all dimen­sions of the trans­at­lantic rela­ti­onship, from summits to working-level coor­di­na­tion, NATO to the EU-US Trade and Tech­no­logy Council (TTC). The urgency gap that existed between the two sides is starting to close.
…

Euro­pean capi­tals are now conver­ging on a new set of policy objec­tives with China for the first time since 2019, when the EU’s frame­work of trea­ting China as a “partner, compe­titor and systemic rival“ was first laid out. Euro­pean Commis­sion Presi­dent Von der Leyen’s March 2023 speech on how Europe should deal with a China that is “more repres­sive at home and more asser­tive abroad” was an indi­ca­tion of the direc­tion of flow. EU member states have again given the Commis­sion space to be bolder and clearer than some of them are willing to be themselves.
…

China’s push­back
…

At the same time, Beijing has essen­ti­ally decided to accept some level of colla­teral damage to its stan­ding in Europe as the price for deepe­ning and elevating its ties with Moscow at a time of war. In a previous phase of Chinese foreign policy, Xi would neither have agreed to the “no limits” joint state­ment with Putin in the crucial weeks before the Russian inva­sion nor embarked on a full-scale state visit to Moscow at such a conten­tious junc­ture a year later. But in the wider struggle that the PRC under­stands itself to be engaged in with the United States, Xi sees the part­ner­ship with Russia – even a weak­ened Russia – offe­ring greater stra­tegic bene­fits than any other relationship.

…

Taiwan

Where the Sino-Russian rela­ti­onship and the de-risking ques­tion are at the top of Europe’s China debates, the Taiwan ques­tion occu­pies a more deli­cate and compli­cated role. There is now clearer aware­ness of the risks and the stakes for Europe, with the economic shock alone of any cross-Strait conflict dwar­fing that of Russia’s inva­sion. The breadth of the sanc­tions imposed on Moscow has also turned Europe into a part-player in Taiwan-related deter­rence efforts that it was not eigh­teen months ago. China is well aware that the sanc­tions-coali­tion is one that could be repli­cated for Taiwan contin­gen­cies, and saw Europe going far further with Russia than it had anti­ci­pated, with Chinese offi­cials scrambling – for instance – to figure out the impli­ca­tions of the central banking asset freeze.

Yet while there is now Euro­pean willing­ness to warn China about the need for stabi­lity; to make clear that Europe also has a stake in cross-Strait secu­rity; and to find crea­tive ways to expand rela­tions with Taiwan – consis­tent with a One China policy – there is still caution about detailed trans­at­lantic contin­gency plan­ning for any sanc­tions measures. This is not just out of neur­algic anxiety about antago­ni­zing Beijing: there is also a concern among Euro­pean poli­cy­ma­kers that any pre-emptively agreed lowest common- deno­mi­nator measures may do more to under­whelm than deter. For now, the PRC has to take into account Europe’s demons­trated capa­city to surprise on the upside with sanc­tions. And Beijing is well aware that while Euro­peans may be cautious about advance signal­ling, and may not be willing to act decisi­vely for the sake of Taiwan alone, the US front­line posi­tion in any conflict scenario will ensure that Europe feels obliged to do so regardless.

…

The trans­at­lantic action agenda – progress and prospects

As the recent G7 summit in Hiro­shima high­lighted, United States and Europe, and their wider network of part­ners and allies in the Indo-Pacific, are now more closely aligned in subs­tance. Where prior summits still saw diffe­ren­tia­ting language on China from Euro­pean leaders, reflec­ting their concerns about “bloc poli­tics” and “confron­ta­tion“, this looked closest to a real consensus rather than a paper one. The issues at stake have high stakes for the future inter­na­tional secu­rity order and major economic inte­rests at home, and will be subjected to fierce intra-Euro­pean and trans­at­lantic debate. But depic­ting this as “divi­sion” obviates the fact that agree­ments on conse­quen­tial areas of policy continue to be reached none­theless. It is not an analy­tical mistake that Beijing tends to make.

For now, the fastest-moving areas of coope­ra­tion have been on the defen­sive side. Europe’s progress on agre­eing an economic secu­rity stra­tegy offers the pros­pect that it will move out of reac­tive mode on issues ranging from export controls to outbound invest­ment scree­ning. But even if the United States remains the pace-setter, there is now a suite of diffe­rent areas in which the two sides are in synch, and can be expected to line up their approa­ches in the coming years. Despite this, it will remain important for the United States to be vigi­lant across areas of secu­rity where gaps and defi­ci­en­cies are already appearing, such as the lagging of certain Euro­pean count­ries on rollout of secure 5G networks, and the expan­sive openings for Chinese actors in other areas of Europe’s digital infrastructure.

…

Conclu­sion

The United States and Europe have reached a far deeper level of coor­di­na­tion on China than looked plau­sible a few years earlier. Russia’s inva­sion of Ukraine might have been expected to consume the two sides’ poli­tical focus; it has instead led to an even greater aware­ness of how closely the Atlantic and Indo-Pacific thea­tres are now inter­con­nected. The coali­tion that the United States needs to build to address the shared chal­lenges posed by China spans multiple domains and geogra­phies. Europe will remain a vital part of it in the years to come.

***

Testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations 
Subcom­mittee on Europe and Regional Secu­rity Cooperation

June 7th 2023
Hearing: “Alig­ning trans­at­lantic approa­ches on China”

Noah Barkin
Senior Advisor, China Prac­tice, Rhodium Group
Visi­ting Senior Fellow, Indo-Pacific Program, German Marshall Fund of the United States

Chair Shaheen, Ranking Member Ricketts, distin­gu­ished members of the Committee. Thank you for the oppor­tu­nity to talk to you today about trans­at­lantic coope­ra­tion on China.

Europe’s rela­ti­onship with China has been worsening for more than half a decade, mirro­ring the decline in rela­tions between Washington and Beijing.

In past years, Euro­pean concerns centred around issues of economic compe­ti­ti­ve­ness and market access. But they have since broa­dened to encom­pass worries tied to human rights, economic coer­cion, stra­tegic depen­den­cies, disin­for­ma­tion, and security.

Europe entered a new phase in its rela­ti­onship with China follo­wing Russia’s inva­sion of Ukraine in February 2022. The “no limits” part­ner­ship sealed between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin in the weeks before the war began and China’s subse­quent refusal to condemn Russia’s aggres­sion, are cemen­ting the view of China as a compe­titor and systemic rival. Importantly, the war has also increased aware­ness, both in Euro­pean govern­ments and corpo­rate board­rooms, about the risks of a conflict over Taiwan.

Today, there is an intense debate underway in major Euro­pean capi­tals about redu­cing economic depen­den­cies on China. Euro­pean Commis­sion Presi­dent Ursula von der Leyen deli­vered an important speech on March 30th in which she argued for a “de-risking” of the Europe’s rela­ti­onship with China. Over the coming months, Europe will begin the process of defi­ning what de-risking means in practice.

The hardening of Europe’s line can obscure diffe­rences that exist between the 27 EU member states, and in some cases, within indi­vi­dual Euro­pean govern­ments. On the hawkish end of the spec­trum are a group of eastern Euro­pean count­ries led by Lithuania, which promote a values-based foreign policy. At the dovish extreme is a country like Hungary. The largest EU states, inclu­ding Germany and France, fall some­where in between.

As we saw on Presi­dent Emma­nuel Macron’s recent trip to China, France stands out for its support of Euro­pean stra­tegic auto­nomy – code for an inde­pen­dent Europe that is not overly reliant on China or the United States. Germany stands out for having what is by far the closest economic rela­ti­onship with China of any Euro­pean country. Accor­ding to new figures from Rhodium Group, German firms accounted for 84 percent of total EU foreign direct invest­ment in China last year.

Germany is also the country in Europe where the debate over rela­tions with China is the most intense. Chan­cellor Olaf Scholz’s coali­tion is divided over how far and fast to go in reca­li­bra­ting ties with China. Still, it is fair to say that the “win-win” economic narra­tive that fuelled close ties between Berlin and Beijing in recent decades is incre­asingly being eroded by condi­tions on the ground in China and compe­ti­tion from Chinese firms in core German industries.

I’d like to conclude with a few obser­va­tions about trans­at­lantic coope­ra­tion on China.

First, I believe we have seen a great deal of conver­gence between the US and Europe over the past two years on the language that is being used to define the chal­lenges posed by China. In recent months, we’ve seen senior offi­cials on both sides of the Atlantic embrace the term de-risking. And we’ve seen offi­cials distance them­selves from the idea of a full-blown economic decou­pling from China.

Second, this alignment is more than just rheto­rical. There is a growing trans­at­lantic consensus on the need to reduce depen­den­cies on China, diver­sify to other markets, and improve the resi­li­ence of supply chains.

Third, the US and EU have created a series of struc­tured dialo­gues on China related chal­lenges in recent years. The US-EU Trade and Tech­no­logy Council held its fourth minis­te­rial meeting in Sweden last week. China also features incre­asingly in discus­sions within NATO and the G7.

Fourth, as I mentioned earlier, the war in Ukraine has pushed the US and Europe closer toge­ther and focused minds in Europe on the risks of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

That said, it is wrong to expect perfect alignment between the US and Europe on China. The US is an incum­bent super­power. It plays a vital secu­rity role in the Indo-Pacific. And it is not a coll­ec­tion of count­ries with diffe­rent inte­rests like the EU. As a result, it sees China through a diffe­rent prism than Europe does. And its response reflects this.

There is no appe­tite in Euro­pean capi­tals for contai­ning or isola­ting China, and there are concerns in some capi­tals about what is perceived as an overly confron­ta­tional approach from some poli­ti­cians in Washington, parti­cu­larly on the issue of Taiwan.

There is a consensus in Europe that despite the growing strains – but also because of these strains – one must continue to engage robustly with Beijing. As a result, we have seen a flurry of visits by Euro­pean leaders since China ended its strict zero-COVID poli­cies at the end of last year.

While there is a nascent push in Europe to reduce depen­den­cies on China, the appe­tite for paying an economic price in the name of national secu­rity is not as deve­loped as it is in the US or in a country like Japan. The threat percep­tion is evol­ving in Europe, but more gradu­ally. As we’ve seen on Ukraine, however, Europe is capable of major shifts in policy in times of crisis.

I am convinced that buil­ding trans­at­lantic conver­gence on China, and limi­ting the risks of diver­gence, depends on robust enga­ge­ment between the US and EU on the trade, tech­no­logy and secu­rity issues that are at the heart of the chal­lenges presented by Beijing’s policies.

This will include buil­ding a posi­tive trans­at­lantic narra­tive, inclu­ding on trade and invest­ment, that is not only about China. It will require that the US look beyond the daily noise on China policy that is coming from 27 EU member states, remem­be­ring that Europe is not a mono­lith. And it will require that the admi­nis­tra­tion and members of Congress are active, persis­tent, patient and when neces­sary forceful in making their policy argu­ments to Euro­pean coun­ter­parts behind closed doors.

We are on a similar trajec­tory on China that has been driven by policy choices in Beijing. If Europe has a strong partner in Washington, I am convinced that Washington will have a strong partner in Europe.

***

The common front against China

The state­ments of the above cited two GMF-think-tank-members confirm the poli­tical goals: The lobby­ists on the U.S. side are concerned with buil­ding a front against China toge­ther with Europe and drawing EU states into the conflicts of the Atlantic hegemon.

Bonnie S. Glaser holds the important posi­tion of execu­tive director, GMF Indo-Pacific, with the orga­ni­sa­tion. She is addi­tio­nally a Board Member on the U.S. Committee at the Council for Secu­rity Coope­ra­tion for Asia-Pacific and a member of the Council of Foreign Rela­tions and the Inter­na­tional Insti­tute for Stra­tegic Studies. She is also a Non-Resi­dent Fellow at the Lowy Insti­tute, Sydney, Australia and a Senior Asso­ciate at the Pacific Forum. Last but not least, Bonnie S. Glaser acts as a Senior Advisor for the Taiwan-Asia Exch­ange Foundation.

Previously, she served as East Asia Consul­tant for the U.S. Depart­ment of Defence & State, as well as Senior Advisor for Asia and Director of the „China Power Project“ at the Centre for Stra­tegic and Inter­na­tional Studies (CSIS) and Senior Asso­ciate of the CSIS Inter­na­tional Secu­rity Program.

As Director of the China Power Project, Glaser appeared before the U.S. Senate Small Busi­ness and Entre­pre­neur­ship Committee in 2019 on „Made in China 2025 and the Future of American Industry“ to provide her assess­ment of the situa­tion from the perspec­tive of American interests.

Bonnie S. Glaser stated in general that GMF was acting bipar­tisan, but pursues an agenda that strongly aligns with the desires of her colle­agues who appeared before U.S. Senate commit­tees on June 7, 2023: To forge a coali­tion as broad as possible with count­ries to pull them over to the Atlantic side and perpe­tuate U.S. hegemony. GMF appears to be more of a trans­con­ti­nental shadow opera­tion to coor­di­nate such activities.

The situa­tion is remi­nis­cent of that, some 20 years before World War I, when the United Kingdom (UK) and trans­na­tional master­minds looked for alli­ances to perpe­tuate their hege­monic course. This time, EU-Europe and Asian states are supposed to carry-over the hege­monic inte­rests of the United States to China altog­e­ther, but supposed to comple­tely forget their own inte­rests in favour of Atlantic intentions.

A study by the Rhodium Group found-out, that a possible Chinese economic blockade of Taiwan could jeopar­dize $2 tril­lion worth of economic acti­vity. Europe is curr­ently pain­fully reali­zing what it means to be dragged into a war by Anglo-America, as is curr­ently the case with Ukraine. This should be an impres­sive and clear warning not only to the EU states, but also to the states in Asia against the parti­ci­pa­tion in other and more Atlantic adventures!

A contri­bu­tion from Unser-Mittel­eu­ropa Global Research